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OF SHRINKING SEATSUITS AND POISON VINE WAX: A
COMPARISON OF BASIS FOR EXCUSE UNDER UCC 2-615 AND
CISG ARTICLE 79
Carla Spivack
INTRODUCTION
An American wholesaler contracts with an Italian company for the
design, production and shipment of high-end shoes for sale in the United
States. The parties agree that the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (“CISG”) will govern the contract. All goes well until the Italian
company’s subcontractor, a shoe designer, fails to deliver. The Italian
company breaks off production and claims commercial impracticability due
to the failure of the subcontractor. The American wholesaler sues for
breach. What result can the parties expect? Can the American company
expect a result in line with Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) cases, or
will CISG jurisprudence mandate a different outcome? And if there is a
different outcome, is there any basis for applying different standards to cross
border transactions than to domestic sales?
The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(“CISG”) is arguably the most influential uniform law on transborder sales
in the world today.1 American lawyers whose clients engage in such
transactions can both save time and money and increase drafting options by
understanding the CISG and its differences from American law. In an age
when contracts for the sale of goods between American and European
companies are common, and in which events all over the world can affect
performance under these contracts, it is especially important to understand
how CISG cases on excuse2 compare with the UCC tradition more familiar
to Americans. Most contracts for the sale of goods between CISG signatory
nations, unless they specify otherwise, are governed by the CISG; over sixty
nations are signatories to the CISG, representing over two thirds of world
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William E. Nelson and Clayton Gillette for getting this project off the ground, the New
York University Law and Humanities Colloquium, especially Sarah Abramowicz and Kerry
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As I will discuss below, the comparable CISG term is “exemption.”
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trade.3 The United States ratified the treaty in 1985, and it became effective
for American companies in 1988.4
This article compares CISG and UCC jurisprudence on excuse for
nonperformance, and argues for an application of the CISG in excuse cases
which is stricter than the UCC, and, I suggest, consistent with the drafters’
intent and the goals of the Treaty. As I will discuss, textually, the CISG’s
Article 79 seems to set out much narrower grounds for excuse than does the
UCC’s section 2-615. In practice, however, cases in the two jurisdictions
diverge less than the wording of the two statutes might lead one to expect,
evincing comparable reluctance to excuse nonperformance. There are two
reasons for this similarity: first, American courts construe 2-615 more
narrowly than its language might predict, and, second, tribunals applying the
CISG hear more bases for excuse than Article 79, based on its drafters’
intentions, probably allows. In other words, American courts construe 2615 more narrowly than its wording seems to allow, while tribunals
applying the CISG apply Article 79 more broadly than its wording seems to
justify. The result is that Article 79 tribunals hear cases for excuse that
would seem to be acceptable only under the UCC, while cases decided
under the UCC do not show any tendency to excuse nonperformance more
often than the CISG.
This unintended convergence is not the end of the story, however.
The fact remains that the CISG’s wording, at least, on the subject of excuse
is intentionally narrower than that of the UCC, and this strictness, if
rigorously applied, serves the interest of promoting international trade.5 The
3

As of this writing, signatory nations are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
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4
The United States derogated from Article 1(1)(b), thus limiting application of the CISG to
contracts between contracting states only, and not to contracts between one party in a
contracting state and another not in a contracting state, even if private international law
would otherwise mandate application of the CISG. See Harry M. Flechtner, The Several
Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations
and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & Com. 187, 19596 (1998).
5
Other commentators have of course noted that the CISG is stricter than the UCC with
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fact that tribunals have shown greater flexibility than is warranted in
allowing cases to be brought under Article 79 is not necessarily a good
thing, and will not necessarily continue to be the case. A more limited
reading of Article 79, and one the drafters intended, is more suited to
transborder transactions, and should be encouraged, for the following
reasons.
International business deals tend to consist of what are called
“relational contracts:” they extend over many years, involve series of
transactions rather than single isolated deals, and rest upon a strong
relationship between the parties involved.6 First of all, because they are long
term, such contracts entail a high risk of being disrupted by a vast array of
changing political and economic factors. To enter into such long term
agreements, parties on both sides need some assurances of stability despite
this risk. Article 79 provides that, if applied consistently with its wording, it
would render most of the political and economic vicissitudes attendant on
transborder sales unavailable as excuses for nonperformance – in fact, it
would deny them a forum to be heard. As a consequence, Article 79 gives
parties to a contract incentive to write into the agreement details about what
changes in circumstance will permit renegotiation or modification, and the
requirement that such modification be negotiated between the parties rather
than in litigation. Renegotiation during the life of a contract is the norm in
international business transactions and the more the parties can anticipate
and provide for it, the less painful and disruptive it need be.7 The CISG
language may also move parties to include some kind of renegotiation
clause, which would allow for the contractual relationship to continue rather
than falter – clearly promoting the CISG’s very goals. Knowing that the
CISG offers no recourse in times of change, the parties, who are in a much
better position to do so than a tribunal brought in after the fact, will work to
anticipate possible events which might change the nature of the deal, and
write provisions for dealing with them into the contract.
What I see as the unwarranted flexibility of Article 79 tribunals may
arise because local arbitrators are interpreting and applying Article 79 in
respect to excuse.
6
Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, The Doctrine of Impracticability, and the
Governance of Relational Contracts,13 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 227, 230-233 (2004).
7
Jeswald W. Salacuse, RENEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: THE
CONTINUING STRUGGLE OF LIFE AGAINST FORM , 35 INTLLAW 1507, 1509 (2001).
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light of their own local laws on excuse, which, at least in the case of
European jurisdictions, is more flexible. Indeed, when the CISG first
appeared, commentators expressed the concern that this would happen.8 As
CISG jurisprudence evolves, however, this may change, and it is one of the
goals of this article to urge a more literal reading of Article 79.
In saying this, I disagree with commentators who have criticized
Article 79 for being “so vague that there are bound to be differences of
interpretation in different jurisdictions and the prime purpose of any
uniform law will in consequence be defeated.”9 Indeed, this particular
commentator has also claimed that the words in Article 79 is “are elastic
words, which . . . provide . . . no guidance to the courts which will have to
interpret the provision.”10 To the contrary, I suggest that the words
themselves, their literal meaning in the official Treaty languages, and the
accompanying drafting history, make their meaning clear. They are not
meant to be read in the context of the local legal cultures of individual
adjudicators, but in the context of a uniform sales law which is developing
its own literature and commentary. They only become troublesome when
read out of that context. This should hardly unsettle American lawyers,
Erie-bound to recognize a split between state and Federal law: one word can
mean different things, and have different effects on the outcome of a case, in
each regime.
In this article, I analyze the texts of the two statutes, and compare
cases decided under UCC Section 2-615 and CISG Article 79; in the case of
the latter, where feasible, I have examined the cases in the original
languages as well as in translation in order to perform as precise an analysis
as possible.11 My comparison will focus on three areas of discrepancy: the
nature of an excusing event, the failure of subcontractors, and the wider
8

See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, “Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,” in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5-1 – 5-24
(Galston & Smit eds., 1984).
9

See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, “Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,” in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5-1
(Galston & Smit eds., 1984).
10
Barry Nicholas, “Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,” in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5-1
(Galston & Smit eds., 1984).
11
I have indicated in the footnotes to the cases when the translations are my own.
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category of damages allowed under the CISG. Other commentators have
noted that the CISG is stricter than the UCC in regard to excuse,12 and other
articles have touched upon the first and second points of comparison, but
none has offered a comprehensive analysis of these issues, or indeed,
detailed analysis of a broad segment of CISG case law based on the original
texts of decisions.13 No article has yet situated these differences in the
context of commercial law and the culture of international trade. I do so,
suggesting that the harsher standards under the CISG are more suitable to
that arena than the arguably more flexible standards of the UCC. I will
suggest that the underlying goals of the UCC and those of the CISG are
fundamentally different. Ultimately, I argue that the absolutist language of
Article 79 is not, as many critics have claimed,14 a weakness and result of
sloppy drafting. Rather, when literally applied, it promotes exactly the goals
the treaty intended: it creates security in transborder sales, and forces the
parties to these contracts, who are in much better positions to do so than
tribunals, to predict contingencies and negotiate risk allocation.15 Part of the
purpose of this article is to urge tribunals – and American courts applying
the CISG – to recognize the differences in the two regimes, and the reason
for these differences.
The CISG and the UCC provisions on excuse differ with respect to
three important issues: 1) what constitutes a circumstance severe enough to
excuse performance, 2) the contracting party’s liability for the failure of
subcontractors, and 3) the scope of damages. With respect to the first issue,
12

See, e.g., ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLCIATONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 501
(1989) (also observing that the CISG is more liberal than most civil codes, which demand
literal impossibility).
13
See Ole Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of European Contract Law, 13 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 339 (2001); Dionysios P. Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of
Performance and Clausula Rebus sic Stantibus in the 1980 Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 261 (2001); Todd Weitzmann,
Validity and Excuse in the UN Sales Convention, 16 J.L & COM. 265 (1997); Henry D.
Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods:
From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 279
(1997); Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising UCC
Article 2 in Light of the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43 (191); for a
discussion of excuse under the CISG, see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT,
SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 229-33 (1999).
14
See.e.g., ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GODS 501-502
(1989) (collecting quotes about the ambiguity and imprecision of Article 79).
15
CISG Article 7(1) articulates the treaty’s goals as “promot[ing] uniformity in [CISG’s]
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”
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UCC 2-615 refers to performance becoming “impracticable” as possible
grounds for excuse, while CISG Article 79 requires performance to be
prevented by an “impediment.” As I will show, this difference indicates that
the CISG category of excuse is much narrower, and requires a literal,
objective – perhaps physical - bar to performance, while the UCC’s term
“impracticability” suggests that the category might include a less tangible
barrier.16 Second, while under the UCC, a subcontractor’s failure is
analyzed under the foreseeability doctrine, the CISG is much stricter: it
requires the subcontractor to satisfy the same requirements as the
contracting party. Finally, while a finding of excuse under 2-615 relieves
the nonperforming party from liability for damages, paragraph (5) of Article
79 expressly reserves the complaining party’s right to other remedies under
the Treaty, including reduction in price and demand for performance.
As I have noted, the case law in both UCC and CISG jurisdictions
diverges from what the wording of the actual statutes seems to require.
Despite the seemingly expansive trend in the black letter law, cases applying
UCC 2-615 have consistently construed any ambiguities in the language
narrowly against the party claiming excuse.17 With respect to CISG cases, a
significant difficulty with Article 79 case law is that it does not necessarily
implement the intentions of the Treaty’s drafters. For example, tribunals
often allow defenses to be brought under Article 79 that the drafting history
of that Article does not seem to countenance: several tribunals, for example,
allow parties to argue for an exemption based on difficulty, rather than
objective impossibility, which the text of Article 79 seems not envision.
Another example arises when, despite the fact that the drafting history and
the Secretariat Commentary specifically states that suppliers of goods or raw
materials are not to be considered third parties under Article 79,18 many
tribunals allow defenses under Article 79 for supplier failure.19 To some
extent, these discrepancies may be the fulfillment of some of the dire
predictions attendant on the drafting: commentators warned that it
contained ambiguities which would lead to the imposition of meanings that
“best conform to the reader’s background,”20 not those which reflect the
drafters’ intentions.
16

See Official Comment 3 to UCC 2-615 which contrasts the test of commercial
impracticability with impossibility and frustration of purpose.
17
Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, The Doctrine of Impracticability, and the
Governance of Relational Contracts,13 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 227, 228-229 (2004).
18
Secretariat Commentary 12
19
See infra pp. 28ff.
20
WILLIAM FARNSWORTH, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 135 (1983).
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In Part One, I will introduce the CISG and its goals, compare the
texts of UCC Section 2-615 and of CISG Article 79, and discuss the
applicable commentary and the goals of the two regimes. In Part Two, I will
discuss relevant cases: first, UCC cases on economic hardship, which
suggest that “impracticability” may have slightly broader coverage than
“impediment,” then third party cases and damages. Ultimately, I hope to
show that the CISG’s strict excuse doctrine is not only reasonable in the
context of international business transactions, but, in fact, necessary for the
flourishing of international trade.
Because there is a relative scarcity of CISG cases compared to UCC
cases, I have limited my discussion of American law to cases which can
helpfully be compared to CISG cases dealing with similar issues and fact
patterns. Because many of the Article 79 cases arise due to changed
economic circumstances, I have chosen several UCC cases which turn on
the same issue. Because civil law tribunals rely more heavily than do
common law ones on legal treatises, I will quote commentary where
necessary to explicate aspects of CISG excuse jurisprudence that the cases
leave unclear. The main sources for clarification of the CISG are the
Secretariat Commentary (the closest to an Official Commentary available),
the Treaty’s legislative history, which includes summaries of committee
meetings, and other commentaries.
21

I. HISTORY, GOALS AND TEXTS
A.

History of the CISG and the UCC

The CISG is the result of fifty years of drafting and negotiation.22 Its
roots lie in two earlier conventions promulgated by the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT): the Uniform Law
for the Formation of Contracts (ULF), and the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (ULIS), both of which had been developed by
committees of international law experts and finalized in 1964, but neither of
which had received much acceptance beyond Western Europe.23 The
21

This is probably because most American parties contract around the CISG.
See generally PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE U.N. CONVENTION ON
THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS (1986) (available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html).
23
JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES 1
(1989).
22
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CISG’s drafting began in 1968, under the auspices of the United Nations
Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the Treaty was
approved in 1980.24
Drafting of the UCC began in 1945,with Karl Llewellyn as Chief
Reporter.25 It was finally approved in 1951, but took some time to gain wide
acceptance; the late 50’s and 60’s saw it become statutory in most states.26
Article 2 itself was revised in 2003, although much of it has not yet been
widely adopted.27
B. Goals of the CISG and the UCC
The CISG’s goals are to promote uniformity in international sales
law and, in doing so, to remove barriers to international trade.28 As of this
writing, all major trading nations other than the United Kingdom and Japan
have signed the Treaty.29 It does not apply to personal, family or household
goods.30 It can apply when the contracting parties are from signatory states,
when the contract is for the sale of goods, and when the conflict of law rules
of the forum require its application.31 In short, the CISG is probably the
uniform law most influential on transborder commerce in the world today.32
Because transborder transactions are subject to the many
vicissitudes which can arise in international affairs and make a contract
difficult to perform, the question of what excuses nonperformance is an
24

JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES 1
(1989).
25
For a general history of the UCC, see Richard E. Coulson, Private Law Codes and the
Uniform Commercial Code – Comments on History, 27 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 615
(2002).
26
Richard E. Coulson, Private Law Codes and the Uniform Commercial Code – Comments
on History, 27 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 615, 627 (2002).
27
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW: SELECTED STATUTES 1 (2005).
28
29

Peter Schelchtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the
CISG, 36 VUWLR 781 (2005).
30
31

Peter Schelchtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the
CISG, 36 VUWLR 781, 782 (2005). The U.S. and China, among others, chose to opt out of
1(1)(b), which makes the Treaty applicable when “the rules of private international law lead
to the application of the law of a Contracting State,” so that this last sphere of application is
not part of the U.S. adoption of CISG law. Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of
Application and Sphere of Applicability of the CISG, 36 VUWLR 781, 783 (2005).
32
Peter Schelchtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the
CISG, 36 VUWLR 781, 782 (2005).
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important one to clarify. Examples of vicissitudes unique to international
trade include: currency devaluation, political change, war, privatization of
resources, expropriation, regulation and climate change. I turn first to the
texts of the two statutes as a framework for comparing their approach to the
issue.
The drafting history of Article 79 reveals a desire to restrict the
leeway that previous regimes had allowed for nonperformance to be
excused.33 For example, Article 74 of the Hague Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, the Treaty preceding the CISG, excused
performance not only on the basis of physical and legal impossibility and
changed circumstances which fundamentally altered the nature of the
performance owed, but also potentially performance which changed
circumstances had made more difficult.34 Many members of the working
group which prepared the proposed draft of Article 79 therefore wanted to
make grounds for excuse more objective: ultimately any consideration of
fault with respect to non-performance was dropped in favor of an objective
test, which required that the excuse be based on an impediment beyond the
promissor’s control. As I will show, the narrowness of this provision makes
perfect sense in the context of international sales for a number of reasons,
including the nature of international sales contracts and the nature of
international transactions.
Article 2 arose in a different context and exemplifies different goals
from Article 79.35 The basis of Article 2 is the “factual bargain” of the
parties, and it calls on courts, when necessary, to determine what that is.36
Such a determination is to be based on an examination of the parties’ course
of dealing and prior usage of trade to discover what the parties understood
and intended.37 Having established the “factual bargain,” the courts’ role is
to “limit it in term of good faith, reasonableness and decency.”38 Such a role
33

PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS 601 (1998).
34
PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS 601 (1998).
35
For a discussion of the goals of the UCC which I will rely on here, see John E. Murray,
The Article 2 Prism: the Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 21:1 WASHBURN L. J. 1.
36
John E. Murray, The Article 2 Prism: the Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 21:1 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 20.
37
John E. Murray, The Article 2 Prism: the Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 21:1 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 20.
38
John E. Murray, The Article 2 Prism: the Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
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for tribunals in international sales disputes is unrealistic and undesirable.
When the parties are from different countries, the task of delving into and
understanding their intentions as reflected in prior dealings is much too
onerous and costly. To the contrary, it is much more efficient and cheaper
for parties in such transactions to rely on themselves to clarify their
expectations and intentions to each other. This is especially true in the area
covered by 2-615 and Article 79, the area of excuse. Buyers and Sellers are
much better at anticipating contingencies that might occur relevant to their
transactions, and in much better positions to allocate their risk.
International tribunals are not equipped to investigate prior dealings and
implement “good faith, reasonableness and decency.” By barring recourse
to outside adjudication for anything but literal impossibility, Article 79
forces parties to anticipate and allocate risks of nonperformance, which, in
turn, serves the goals of the CISG by furthering international transactions.
A consideration of the texts of the two statutes will show how Article 79
achieves this.
C. What Event Constitutes an Excusing Event: The Texts of the Two
Sections on Excuse and the Relevant Commentary
The text of UCC 2-615 reads as follows:39
Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions.
Except to the extent that a Seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to Section 2-614:
(a) Delay in performance or nonperformance in whole or in part by a
Seller that complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of the
Seller's duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the
nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves
to be invalid.

Uniform Commercial Code, 21:1 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 20.
39
I use throughout the pre-2003 version of UCC Article 2, because to date, no jurisdiction
has adopted the 2003 revised version. COMMERCIAL AND DEBTOR CREDITOR LAW:
SELECTED STATUTES 1 (2005).
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(b) If the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the
Seller's capacity to perform, the Seller must allocate production and
deliveries among its customers but may at its option include regular
customers not then under contract as well as its own requirements for
further manufacture. The Seller may so allocate in any manner that is
fair and reasonable.
(c) The Seller must notify the Buyer seasonably that there will be
delay or nonperformance and, if allocation is required under paragraph
(b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the Buyer.
CISG Article 79 reads as follows:
Exemptions:
1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if
he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his
control and that he could not
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment
into
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has
engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt
from liability only if:
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the
provisions of that paragraph were applied to him.
(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during
which the impediment exists.
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the
impediment and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not
received by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails
to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for
damages resulting from such non-receipt.
(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right
other than to claim damages under this Convention.

12

First of all, the headings of the two corresponding sections, UCC 2-615
and CISG Article 79, reveal significantly different points of focus. UCC
Section 2-615 is titled: “Excuse By Failure Of Presupposed Conditions.”40
By contrast, the corresponding CISG sections 79 and the related subsequent
section 80 are headed: “Exemptions.”41 Thus, at the outset, the emphasis of
the two provisions differs:
the UCC focuses on reasons for
nonperformance, whereas the CISG heading reminds the reader of the
general duty to perform a contract and the limited possibility of release from
that duty. It shows no interest in enumerating reasons for nonperformance.
Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “excuse” as “a reason alleged for
doing or not doing a thing; a matter alleged as a reason for relief or
exemption,” while it defines “exemption” as “freedom from a general duty
or service; immunity from a general burden, tax, or charge.”42 This
definition is consistent with the other language versions of the Article 79:
the German version, for example, is titled “Befreiungen,” which also
indicates release from a general duty, the French heading is, similarly,
“exoneration,” the Spanish is “exoneracion.” 43
Thus, while the UCC’s heading, “excuse” emphasizes the reason for
the exemption from the duty to fulfill the contract, the CISG’s heading,
“exemption,” refers to a universal duty to carry out contractual obligations
which may be suspended in rare circumstances. By using “exemption”
instead of “excuse” the CISG, unlike the UCC, evinces little judicial interest
in itemizing and investigating reasons for nonperformance. Clearly, the
heading of 2-615 contemplates, while that of Article 79 does not, the
possibility of a valid reason being given for the failure to perform a duty.
Indeed, the rest of the heading – “by failure of presupposed condition” –
supplies that reason. In sum, then, the headings of the two sections suggest
a greater willingness on the part of the UCC to examine reasons for
nonperformance, and a concern on the part of the CISG to urge compliance
with a general duty.
Before turning to the difference between “impracticable” and
“impediment,” it is worth noting that the two provisions also differ in the
language of release. While the UCC states that excused nonperformance is
40

UCC 2-615.
Article 80 reads: A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the
extent that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission.
42
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566, 571 (6th ed., 1990).
43
The official languages of the CISG are English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and
Arabic. The Chinese version does not have a separate heading. These translations are my
own.
41
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“not a breach,” the CISG declares that the exempted nonperforming party is
“not liable.” The scope of the phrase “not liable” is narrower than the
UCC’s “breach” language; it exempts the nonperforming party form
damages, while paragraph 5 of Article 79 allows for the exercise of all the
other remedies for breach the Convention allows.44 2-615, on the other
hand, by declaring that the nonperforming party is not in breach, forecloses
all remedies.
In general terms, the UCC excuses performance upon on the
occurrence of a contingency which makes performance impracticable, and
when one of two other elements is established: 1) the contingency was one
whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption upon which the contract was
made, or 2) the contingency was caused by good faith compliance with an
intervening government regulation or order.45 Any occurrence which was
“sufficiently foreshadowed” at the time of contracting bars the application
of this section.46 Courts applying 2-615 perform a one or two-step inquiry:
first, if the parties could reasonably have foreseen the hindering event at the
time of contracting, excuse will be denied.47 If the event was not
foreseeable, the court must determine whether it truly prevented
performance.48 (Of course, grounds for excuse available in section 2-615
may be negated by language in the agreement.49) The issue then becomes, of
course, what “impracticable” means.
The question of whether market change constitutes impracticability
is a difficult one. According to comment 4, neither increased cost nor the
rise or collapse of a market offers grounds for excuse, but it does leave open
the possibility that a severe shortage of raw materials or supplies due to war,
embargo or other contingency may do so. Moreover, comment 1 elaborates
on the word “impracticable” by modifying it with the adjective
“commercially,” suggesting that a severe change in the benefits expected to
accrue to one party under a contract might fall under this paragraph.
The CISG, by contrast, allows for exemption when nonperformance
1) is due to an “impediment” which was not only beyond the control of the
44
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nonperforming party, but also 2) which was not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the contract, as well as 3) which the non-performing party could
not reasonably have overcome or avoided, and 4) whose consequences he
could not have avoided or overcome.50 Performance is exempted only for as
long as the impediment exists, and the party seeking exemption must give
reasonably prompt notice which is actually received by the other party.51
Unlike UCC 2-615, the text of Article 79 makes no mention of compliance
with government regulations or orders, indicating that they do not constitute
a per se basis for excuse. Further, according to the Secretariat Commentary
on Article 79, a nonperforming party must prove not only that he could not
reasonably have been expected to take the impediment into account, but also
that he could not have avoided or overcome the impediment, nor overcome
nor avoided its consequences.52 The Commentary remarks further that this
may require the party to provide a commercially reasonable substitute for
performance.53
With respect to the first element of Article 79, it must first be noted
that the 2-615 term “impracticable,” on the one hand, and “impediment,” on
the other, mean significantly different things. Impediment is a more
restrictive term, covering only an event which literally prevents performance
of the contract: indeed, some commentators argue that the word
“impediment” was chosen to indicate an actual physical hindrance which
makes performance literally impossible, and that mere economic hardship or
extreme difficulty – i.e., anything short of literal impossibility - is not
covered at all by the section.54 According to one commentator, it describes
“an objective outside force that interferes with the performance of the
contract and cannot be traced back to any national laws.”55 Article 79’s
drafting history is consistent with this interpretation: it indicates that the
drafters chose the term “impediment” to denote an objective outside force
that literally prevents performance, a definition that corresponds to the
American doctrine of “objective impossibility.”56 The corresponding words
in the other official language versions of the treaties corroborate the
50
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objective interpretation of the term “impediment:” the French term,
“empechement,” also means an obstruction or hindrance, and its related
verb, “empecher” means to put a stop to something; the Spanish word,
“impedimento,” derives from the same root as the English word and has the
same sense of objective obstruction, and the Russian term is synonymous
with the term for “obstacle,” such as, for example, a horse might
encounter.57
Some commentators have claimed that the term “impediment” may
also cover the notion of an objective outside force that frustrates the purpose
of the contract, a doctrine which might correspond to the Anglo-American
idea of frustration of purpose.58 The language of Article 79, however, fails
to support this inference: an event which frustrates a contract’s purpose
does not necessarily prevent its performance. Moreover, the UNCITRAL
debates during the drafting of the CISG show that the drafters adopted the
term “impediment” because they opposed allowing economic hardship as an
excuse for nonperformance; as noted above, Article 79 is a stricter version
of its predecessor, Article 74 of The Hague Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (“ULIS”), which had been criticized for
excusing performance too readily when it had merely become more
difficult.59 As a refinement of this notion, the word “impediment” may have
been intended to denote a barrier to performance such as shipping problems,
as opposed to aspects related to the party’s personal actions. Under this
rubric, impediment would cover such disturbances as industrial disputes,
fires, wars, currency changes, or shortage of transport, materials, or power.60
One possibly impeding event which lies in a grey area is the labor
strike or lockout. Commentators on the CISG generally agree that some
strikes and lockouts are foreseeable and some are not, and that this question
must find its answer in a case by case analysis of the circumstances of the
particular contract.61
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CISG tribunals, however, often allow defenses to nonperformance
based on less than physical impossibility to be brought under Article 79,62
which shows that in practice a literal obstacle to performance is not a bar at
least to bringing an excuse claim under Article 79. No tribunal, however,
has excused performance for anything less than a physical obstacle, and
some tribunals have refused even to hear such a defense under Article 79.
Some commentators have suggested that the civil law notion of
hardship, which does cover such circumstances, might serve to expand the
scope of Article 79’s excuse provisions, which reduce the difference
between it and 2-615, textually at least .63 True, most civil law systems
allow considerations of equity and good faith to influence whether
performance is excused due to hardship: the French doctrine of imprevision
and the German one of Wegfall der Geschaeftsgrundlage allow for the
readjustment of the contract based on changed economic circumstances.64
Moreover, the UNIDROIT Principles, which were drafted as a unifying
summary of European sales law, and which function as a kind of European
Restatement, allow for excuse based on hardship under limited
circumstances.65
While the drafting and legislative history make clear that the CISG
was intended to foreclose access to widely differing local law, it is less clear
on this issue of resort to UNIDROIT, which was drafted after the CISG and
designed to further uniformity in European sales law. UNIDROIT Article
6.2.2 allows for hardship when “the occurrence of events fundamentally
alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party’s
performance has increased or because the value of the performance has a
party receives has diminished.”66 The CISG, however, is meant to bring
uniformity to sales law throughout the world, and recourse to a synthesis of
European sales law would hardly further this goal. Moreover, as I have
tried to show, the drafters of Article 79 intended it to have a narrower scope
than previous excuse provisions of local and even uniform laws.
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The same objection applies to the use of the Principles of European
Contract Law (PECL), which, like the UNIDROIT Principles, takes account
of changed circumstances after formation of the contract. Article 6:111,
paragraph 2, of the PECL, excuses performance when 1) it has become
excessively onerous; 2) due to a change of circumstances that occurred after
the contract was formed; 3) the change of circumstances was not one that
could reasonably have been taken into account at the time the contract was
formed; and 4) the risk of the changed circumstances was not one which the
affected party should be required to bear.67
The PECL, of course, sounds much more like the UCC: rather than
the word impediment, the PECL refers to “change of circumstances” and
“onerousness,” which seems more like the UCC’s notions of
“impracticability” and unexpected contingencies. The case law and
commentary suggest that the “excessively onerous” requirement is a harsh
standard, and requires that performance would result in the near ruin of the
performing party.68 The PECL, however, unlike the UCC, requires the
parties to renegotiate a contract which has become excessively onerous: as
an example of how the two regimes would mandate different results, the
PECL commentary to this section cites to one of the contract disputes that
arose as a result of the unexpected closing of the Suez Canal, a change
which dramatically raised the shipper’s cost by making it necessary to sail
around the Cape of Good Hope, a much longer route. Under the PECL, the
parties would have been required to renegotiate the contract; the House of
Lords (where the case was decided), by contrast, simply upheld the
contract.69 The PECL and the UCC can thus lead to different outcomes
despite their seeming similarity. In sum, then, even possible expanders for
the CISG do not seem to undermine the strictness of the impediment
requirement. Recourse to its drafting history and goals, however, make
clear that the CISG was intended to preempt any other regulation in the area
of sales law with respect to contracts it covers.70 The CISG is strict with
respect to excuse because it is in the interest of transborder sales for it to be
so, and the CISG’s goals is to facilitate such transactions
67
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With respect to the foreseeability element, obviously the parameters
of what is “reasonably foreseeable” differ between domestic sales and
transborder transactions. Merchants who routinely engage in international
sales should be able to anticipate a broader scope of circumstances than
those who habitually buy and sell goods only within domestic boundaries.
Thus, courts applying the UCC generally deem a merchant “on notice” of a
contingency like a change in a foreign country’s laws or regulations only if
specific warning of that particular change was available to that merchant,
while CISG tribunals assume that the parties to a transborder transaction are
generally aware of the possibility of changing laws and regulations in their
partner countries and beyond.71
The third requirement of Article 79, that the impediment be one that
the party could not have overcome or avoided, does not appear in the text of
2-615, but finds expression in 2-615 case law. Both regimes apply the
reasonable person standard to determine what actions must be taken.72
Finally, 2-615 and Article 79 differ in scope. Article 79 may be
raised as a defense for the delivery of nonconforming goods, while the UCC
does not offer this option. Under the CISG, a buyer who refused to pay for
defective goods would do so under 79(1) because the non-conforming
delivery constituted an “impediment beyond his control” which he could not
reasonably have anticipated.73 English and American law, on the other hand,
infers a warranty by the seller of the conforming nature of the goods, as well
as the duty to deliver them.74
D.

Texts and Commentary on Third Party Failure

Another possible discrepancy between the UCC and the CISG arises
with respect to a party’s liability for the failed performance of his
71
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subcontractor or supplier; here it is clearer that the CISG imposes stricter
standards. UCC Section 2-615 does not contain a provision addressing third
party failure separately: UCC cases use the language of 2-615(a) – “a
contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made” – to impose a nonforeseeability requirement for
excuse under the third party failure doctrine (unless the contract at issue
specifies a single source of supply).75
Article 79 (2)’s third party provisions, on the other hand, specifically
exempt a promissor from liability for third party failure only if 1) the
impediment hindering performance was out of his control and
unforeseeable, and if 2) the third party would also be exempt under that
same standard. The second provision is more than the UCC requires: 2-615
subsumes third party failure under the same foreseeability doctrine, asking
only whether the sub’s – whether a supplier or a contractor – failure was
reasonably foreseeable to the nonperforming party. Thus, Article 79 it
appears to create a more rigorous test.
At least two ambiguities appear to arise in Article 79(2)’s language.
First, it is not clear whether a supplier is considered a third party under the
article. Both the drafting history and the Secretariat Commentary on the
CISG indicate not: according to the Commentary, a third party must be
someone “engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract [and] does
not include suppliers of the goods or of raw materials.”76 to the seller.
tribunals have allowed excuse claims to be brought – though not granted for supplier/shipper failure under Article 79. According to one of the
leading commentators on the CISG, only when the third party is a
“secondary supplier” whom the seller neither chooses nor controls, and
when the seller cannot in any way repair or procure the goods in any other
manner” will performance be excused.77 The bottom line seems to be that if
the contracting party has control over the third party, he cannot make an
Article 79 defense, which would seem to exclude suppliers.78
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Second, the words “to perform all or part of the contract” are not
explained. Thus, it is unclear whether a supplier would constitute a third
party “engaged to perform all or part of the contract” whose breach might
allow for excuse. Debate continues on this matter. Although the drafting
history and the Secretariat Commentary indicate, again, that suppliers are
not covered, tribunals, as mentioned above, have allowed claims to be
brought under Article 79 for supplier failure, and it is possible to imagine,
for example, a contract in which a supplier’s performance would be so
substantial and integral as to fulfill the role of a subcontractor: for example,
a supplier of gas or electricity in a contract to supply power. Commentators
have explained that there must be “an organic link” between the main
contract and the subcontract, such as exists when the contracting party
entrusts the sub with manufacturing goods to the buyer’s specifications, or
with procuring and delivering goods to he buyer.79 This requirement, at
least as tribunals apply it, does not necessarily exclude suppliers as the
above examples make clear – even if this application contradicts the
drafters’ intentions.
As mentioned above, however, the drafting history of Article 79(2)
suggests that suppliers were not meant to be covered. At the March 1980
meeting of the Legislative Committee, Denmark introduced an amendment
which would have added the words “by his supplier or” in paragraph 2,
before the phrase “third party engaged to perform all or part of the
contract.”80 This proposed amendment was ultimately withdrawn, amidst
much discussion about its potential for unacceptably broadening the
exemption, perhaps to an extent, one delegate hinted, that, given the oil
crisis of the time, might disrupt the world economy.81 The ensuing
discussion, however, did allow for the possibility that supplier failure might
be covered by paragraph 1.82
The discussion of supplier failure indicates in other ways that any
such exemption is meant to be very narrow. For example, a proposal was
made – and later rejected - to delete the entire paragraph 2, based on the
concern that it unacceptably broadened paragraph 1’s exemption provision.83
Finally, the Secretariat Commentary on Article 79 states that the term “third
person” does not include “suppliers of the goods or of raw materials to the
79
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seller.”84 As discussed supra, however, the Secretariat Commentary and
other commentaries, as well as the actions of actual tribunals, may conflict.
UCC 2-615, on the other hand, clearly covers suppliers a well as
subcontractors. By subsuming the question of a subcontractor’s failure
under the rubric of “impracticability” caused by “the occurrence of a
contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption in which
the contract was made,” is broad enough cover both types of third party
failure. Comments 4 and 5 to 2-615 tend to corroborate this interpretation of
the section’s scope by linking the issue of third party supply failure to the
standard of foreseeability.85 Thus, when the failure of a subcontractor or
supplier was not reasonably foreseeable at the time a given contract was
formed, Section 2-615 suggests that the main contractor or promissor may
have a basis for excuse.86 In other words, the promissor, at the time of
contract formation, must have reasonably been able to assume that the
contingency would not occur.
Article 79, on the other hand, requires that the third party’s excuse
fulfill the same elements as the main contractor. For performance to be
excused for third party failure, first, the main contractor or promissor must
be exempt under paragraph (1) (there must be an impediment out of his
control and which was not foreseeable at the time of the contract, and he
must have been unable to avoid its consequences). Second, the third party
must also be exempt under the provision of paragraph (1). This means that,
for performance to be excused, the third party must meet the same
requirements as the main contractor: that is, the third party must have met
an impediment which was unforeseeable, which was out of his control, and
which he could not overcome.
Under this analysis, the CISG sets the bar higher than does the UCC
for excuse based on a third party’s failure to perform. While the UCC
merely requires that a third party’s completed performance was a reasonable
assumption on the part of the promissor on which the contract was based,
the CISG requires that this analysis be applied to both the main contractor
84
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and the third party. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which these
discrepancies would lead to different outcomes. For example, a main
contractor might have every reason to believe in the continued reliable
performance of a subcontractor who had worked on many previous projects,
but who, unbeknownst to him, unbeknownst to the main contractor,
suddenly faced unprecedented hardship. Under such circumstances, it is
also reasonable to think that the subcontractor would try to keep its
difficulties hidden from its business partners, making the main contractor’s
assumptions perfectly reasonable.
The UCC seems to allow for
performance to be excused under such circumstances. The CISG, on the
other hand, by applying the same foreseeability standards to the
subcontractor as it applies to the main contractor, precludes such an
outcome. The subcontractor, if it had known about its potential difficulties
and had kept them secret, would not be exempt under paragraph (1), and
thus neither would the main contractor. I now turn to cases decided under
these two regimes to see how these differences have played out.

II. CASES
A.

Impracticability vs. Impediment

The case type that tellingly differentiates the UCC concept of
“impracticability” from the CISG concept of “impediment” is that where
one party seeks to be excused due to a drastic change in market conditions
which makes its performance financially disastrous.
While the term
“impracticable” would seem at least conceivably to cover some of the most
extreme of these cases, the term “impediment,” with its apparently more
limited sense of physical barrier to performance, would not. In fact, the
cases support this supposition: American courts applying 2-615 seem
willing, albeit rarely, to allow market change to be a basis for excuse,
whereas tribunals applying the CISG have not. One must observe, however,
that the latter tribunals have yet to face a case of such extreme financial
disruption as have the few American courts which have allowed financial
hardship as a basis for excuse.
With respect to the UCC, Comment 4 to 2-615 explains that neither
increased cost nor a rise or collapse in a market is a basis for excuse, but it
leaves open the possibility that a severe shortage of supplies due to an
unforeseen and drastic contingency such as war or embargo might excuse
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performance. Many a plaintiff, however, has argued that a change in profit
margins makes performance impracticable under this section.
American courts in sales of goods cases, with notable exceptions,
fairly consistently reject impracticability arguments based solely on market
change. Judge Posner offered a traditional economic analysis of the
doctrine in the Seventh Circuit case Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co. v.
Carbon County Coal Co 87 (“NIPSCO”). In NIPSCO, Carbon County had
sued NIPSCO to enforce performance of a contract to buy its coal. The
utility company argued that performance should be excused under both
UCC 2-615 and the contract’s force majeur clause because, since the
contract had been signed, state regulators had ordered the utility company to
seek out and buy cheaper electricity, if possible, and, if cheaper sources
were available, barred NIPSCO from passing on the cost of more expensive
energy to its customers.88 It turned out to be cheaper for NIPSCO to buy
electricity from a third party than to generate it from the coal it was
contracted to purchase from Carbon County, and NIPSCO knew it would
not be able to pass the higher costs of the Carbon County coal on to
consumers. The District Court refused even to submit the impracticability
defense to the jury, on the grounds that a buyer could not assert
impracticability under Indiana law.89 NIPSCO was found liable for breach,
and ordered to pay damages, amounting to about one billion (i.e., what
NIPSCO would have owed over the lifetime of the contract).90
On appeal, the Circuit Court ruled that the doctrine of
impracticability was inapplicable to NIPSCO’s contract.91 It explained that
the contract had explicitly assigned the risk to NIPSCO.92 The contract at
issue was a fixed price contract: it placed a limit on how low prices could
go, but did not include a ceiling to limit their escalation.93 Such a clause, the
judge asserted, constituted a clear agreement between the parties that the
buyer should bear the risk of price decreases.94 The buyer ran the risk of
87
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having incorrectly predicted the future market, and “has only himself to
blame” if he finds that he has done so.95 He may not use the doctrines of
impracticability to shift the risk back to the seller when this happens.
It made no difference to this analysis that it was an act of
government – a new law requiring utility companies to find the cheapest
energy source available and barring them from passing the cost of more
expensive ones on to ratepayers - that caused one of the parties to lose
money under the contract.96
The Court observed that government
intervention in the marketplace is common – especially in the area of
utilities – and a government act which changes the outcome of the contract
is one of the risks the contract allocates.97 This reasoning, of course, leaves
open the possibility of a different outcome if the contract had failed to
allocate risk as it did, or had failed to address the issue at all.
American courts have similarly denied relief when the change in
economic circumstances takes place at the transborder level even though the
parties are both American companies. The Tenth Circuit, for example,
denied relief to an American importer of sewing machines who had begun
to lose money due to a severe fluctuation in the currency exchange rate with
the exporting country, Switzerland, and hence sought to impose a
corresponding surcharge on its sales to the distributor.98 By the time of the
trial in the District Court, the devaluation of the dollar in relation to the
Swiss franc had doubled the importer’s costs and reduced by half its return
on each dollar it had invested. The trial court refused to interpret the
contract so as to allow the importer to pass on its increased cost to the
distributor through the surcharge.99 The importer appealed, arguing that the
lower court’s interpretation of the contract – i.e., barring the surcharge made performance impracticable.100
The Circuit Court denied relief on three grounds. First, it noted that
the contract always allowed for a gross profit margin, even with the
devaluation of the dollar.101 Second, it concluded from the evidence that the
importer displayed foreknowledge of, and thus assumed, the risk of currency
95
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fluctuations.102 What is interesting here, in contrast to CISG cases, is that the
court looked for specific evidence that this particular party had
foreknowledge of the risk of currency fluctuation; as we will see CISG
courts assume this awareness on the part of companies doing transborder
sales. Finally, the court observed that “cost increases alone, thought great in
extent, do not render a contract impracticable.”103 It went on to hold open
the possibility of impracticability when “the party seeking to excuse
performance could show he could perform only at a loss and that the loss
would be especially severe and unreasonable.”104
U.S. courts applying the UCC have taken the same position in cases
in which regulatory acts of foreign governments increase the costs to a
supplier. Indeed, these courts have gone to the length of insisting that the
supplier find any means possible to acquire the goods, even at a price that
result sin an overall loss under the contract. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, refused to excuse performance under a contract involving
Canadian fertilizer “merely because it is burdensome.”105 In this case,
Canadian government regulations had significantly increased the cost of
performance to a supplier of potash who imported from Canada to sell in the
U.S. Again, the Court based its holding on a combination of foreseeability
and allocation of the risk: it noted that previous Canadian regulations
should have put the supplier on notice of possible further government
action, and asserted the Buyer’s right, absent more severe facts than were
present, “to rely on the party to the contract to supply him with goods
regardless of what happens to the market price.”106 Again, the court relied
partly on evidence that the supplier was on notice of Canadian regulations,
and not on a general awareness of the risks of a transborder transaction.107
On the other hand, at least occasionally, American courts have been
willing to allow changed market conditions to qualify as the basis of excuse
under 2-615. Their willingness to diverge from the general rule seems to
hinge on the extremity of the changed conditions and the element of bad
faith on the part of the party seeking to enforce the contract. The following
two cases impart a sense of what motivates a court to grant excuse under 2102
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615 for dramatic market fluctuations. A District Court has declined to find
that a twenty-four percent increase in the cost of some materials, a 185
percent increase in the cost of others and a twenty-one percent increase of
labor costs excused performance.108 The Seller claimed the increases would
cause a $428,500 loss on the contract whose original profit was to be
$589,500.109 The Court insisted on performance, noting blandly that there
was no showing that the contract would have become unprofitable due to
the increases.110 Even price increases of 50 to 58 percent are not considered
severe enough.111
But the opinion of a second District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania does suggest that under some circumstances economic
changes can become sufficiently egregious to be grounds for excuse.112 The
Aluminum Company of America (“ALCOA”) sought relief from
performance of its toll conversion contract with Essex Group (“Essex”) on
the grounds of impracticability and frustration of purpose.113 The Court,
after a thorough review of the applicable law, granted the requested relief
and reformed the contract to adjust the equities and ensure a fairer
distribution of benefits.114 The main basis for the ruling seems to have been
the extraordinary losses that the increased price of its non-labor costs would
108
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have caused ALCOA and Essex’s possible opportunism in enforcing a
contract that would severely harm a competitor. ALCOA’s losses were
shown to exceed $75 million over the life of the contract, combined with the
fact that Essex stood to gain in proportion to ALCOA’s losses.115
In making this ruling, the Court adopted a less strict application of
the doctrine of impracticability than is customary in UCC or CISG
jurisprudence. A number of converging circumstances contributed to the
inequity of the situation and perhaps to the Court’s anomalous ruling in
ALCOA. First, the losses to ALCOA were staggering, a thousand times
greater than that in another, distinguished case.116 Moreover, because the
fluctuation the contract allowed in what Essex paid ALCOA to process the
aluminum, even at its high end, fell far short of ALCOA’s increased
production costs, Essex was insulated from having to pay the same prices
for aluminum production it would have had to pay another vendor at the
time of the suit. The Court noted this gave Essex a “tremendous advantage .
. . under the contract as it is written and as both parties have performed
it.”117
The problems in ALCOA contract arose because the parties had
agreed to use the Wholesale Price index for Industrial Commodities (“WPIIC”) as the standard by which to account for increases in ALCOA’s nonlabor costs.118 OPEC price hikes and what the Court called “unanticipated”
pollution control costs had caused ALCOA’s electricity costs to rise much
faster than the WPI-IC.119 Although the Court acknowledged that “a mere
change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased
wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond
the normal range, does not amount to impracticability, since it is this sort of
risk that a fixed price contract is intended to cover,” it found that even the
strict impracticability standard of “severe disappointment is clearly met in
the present case.”120 The Court noted that the non-occurrence of an extreme
deviation of the WPI-IC and ALCOA’s non-labor production costs was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made,”121 and declined to find
the risk allocated to ALCOA, because it deemed that the “circumstances
115
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surrounding the contract show[ed] a deliberate avoidance of abnormal
risk.”122
The Court also noted that the contract was negotiated and signed in
1967, before the 1971 oil price increase could have been foreseen.123 The
Court insisted, however, that the fact that a risk is foreseeable or even
recognizable at the time of contract formation does not necessarily end the
inquiry as to impracticability.124 It went on to say, “[i]f it were important to
the decision of this case, the Court would hold that the foreseeability of a
variation between the WPI-IC and ALCOA’s costs would not preclude
relief under the doctrine of impracticability.” It explained this reasoning by
reference to the underlying spirit of the UCC, which calls for a balancing of
the equities in commercial decisions, and sensitivity to “the mores, practices
and habits” of the business world.125 The Court found that there was a point
when the “community’s interest in predictable contract enforcement shall
yield to the fact that enforcement of a particular contract would be
commercially senseless and unjust.”126 Indeed, some of the comments to 2615 arguably support this reading. Comment 4, for example, allows that,
while market collapse itself is not grounds for excuse, there may be
contingencies such as wars, embargos or crop failures, that cause a “marked
increase in cost,” which may.127
What really seems to have driven the Court’s decision, however, was
the issue of good faith, and the sense that Essex was acting opportunistically
in seeking to enforce the contract. While ALCOA’s production costs had
gone up sharply, the price of the aluminum that Essex buying from ALCOA
and reselling had simultaneously risen even more drastically. Thus, the
Court observed that the “margin of profit shows the tremendous advantage
Essex enjoys under the contract” and that “[a] significant fraction of Essex’
advantage is directly attributable to the corresponding . . . losses ALCOA
suffers.”128 Furthermore, the Court also noted that ALCOA manufactured
122
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and sold the same aluminum products as Essex, and that Essex was in
competition with ALCOA for this market. Thus, one benefit to Essex from
enforcing the contract was to undermine a competitor. These inequities
seem to have influenced the court’s decision. Comment 6 to 2-615,
moreover, supports this use of the equity factor in analyzing excuse cases.
It refers to the general policy of the UCC as using “equitable principles in
furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.”129
Two other Federal cases from Pennsylvania, while declining to apply
the doctrine of impracticability, leave open the possibility that it might be
applied in harsher circumstances. In Hancock Paper Company, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that “the problem of the
depressed market [an increase of 8 percent in the Buyer’s costs] does not
reach the level of severity required to excuse performance under either the
Restatement or the UCC.”130 In Publicker Industries, the Eastern District
ruled that a contract to supply ethanol over a three-year period was not
rendered impracticable due to the doubling the Seller’s costs because of
events resulting from the 1973 Mideast war.131 Union Carbide argued that its
aggregate losses under the contract would amount to 5.8 million dollars, but
the Court refused relief on two grounds: first, it quoted Comment 4 to UCC
2-615 to the effect that increased costs alone is not sufficient to render
performance impracticable, and noted that it had found no case in which an
increase of less than one hundred percent had been found to create
impracticability.132 It also agreed with the plaintiff’s contention that,
because the contract had been signed in 1972, a year after the oil producing
countries had instituted a twenty-five percent price increase, further price
hikes were foreseeable.133 Finally, the court also referred to the contract
provision which put a ceiling on price increases as evidence that the Seller
was intended to bear the risk of any “substantial and unforeseen” cost
increase.134
In sum, then, the cases show that the defense of excuse under 2615 based on market failure is unlikely to succeed. The only significant
exception to this rule appears in ALCOA, a case in which an unusual
129
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combination of at least three factors seems to have moved the court to grant
relief: 1) there were some indications that the plaintiff was acting
opportunistically in seeking enforcement of the contract, 2) while the
nonperforming party’s expenses rose exponentially, the performing party’s
profits also increased dramatically, drastically increasing the inequities of
the contract, and
the losses suffered were especially egregious. In
addition, the facts of the case reveal that the parties were competitors in he
same market, and that enforcement of the contract might have financially
disabled one of them. This case thus seems like the exception which proves
the rule, particularly because the court declared that it was excusing
performance of the existing contract under 2-615 for reason of equity.
Perhaps in a similar situation, where the convergence of inequities was
equally compelling, another court applying the UCC would act the same
way, but another similar concatenation seems unlikely. Whatever rationale
courts use, their general trend is to enforce contracts despite losses, even
severe losses, to the party seeking to be excused.
For cases decided under the CISG, I turn to European arbitration
tribunals, which so far have far outstripped American courts in deciding
cases under the Treaty. So far, tribunals in Bulgaria, France, Germany, and
Russia, as well as at the International Chamber of Commerce, have also
refused to excuse performance due to changed market conditions. This
makes perfect sense – even more so than under the UCC – based on the
wording of the treaty and in the context of transborder sales. First, it is
unlikely that a mere market change could impose the kind of physical
impossibility the wording of Article 79 seems to require. Second, in the
context of transborder sales, parties need to be assured that the fluctuations
of national markets will not put their contracts at risk. Only a strict policy
in this regard would further the CISG’s stated goal of promoting
international sales: a seller or buyer who had to worry about every shift
within a country’s borders would endanger the contract would be unwilling
to take the risk.
Tribunals applying the CISG have so far looked upon market failure
defenses unsympathetically, but have allowed them to be heard, despite
indications that Article 79 was not meant to cover this defense at all. CISG
commentators have suggested that increased costs of one hundred percent
may offer a basis for excuse, and that even less than that might be
considered under certain circumstances.135 On the other hand, there is a
135
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consensus that fluctuations of up to fifty percent are insufficient.136
Moreover, as mentioned supra, some commentators argue that the word
“impediment” was chosen to limit the application of the section to cases
when a physical hindrance literally makes performance impossible, and that
economic hardship is not covered at all by the section at all.137 The ultimate
goal of the CISG in this regard is to force parties to negotiate into their
contracts hardship clauses specifically designed to reflect and allocate the
risks attendant upon the particular enterprise, rather than using a “one size
of economic risk fits all” approach.138
Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr France is the perfect example of a
case that should never have received a hearing under Article 79.139 the
Appellate Court of Colmar declined to excuse the Buyer’s performance
despite the fact that a collapse of the automobile market had reduced prices
for the parts it was contracted to buy by about half on the open market. The
Court agreed that this was a “significant drop in prices,” but not one that
was unforeseeable.140 It added that over the life of a long term contract such
as the one at issue, price fluctuations are predictable, and that the Buyer, “an
experienced professional acting in the international market,” should have
addressed this possibility in the contract.141 Having failed to do so, it must
bear the risk.142 What is interesting here is that the Court allowed the excuse
of market change to be heard as part of an Article 79 defense, although it
declined to grant it.
Instead, it ignored difficulties of the word
“impediment” and used a foreseeability analysis, much as an American
court would do. Also interesting is the implication of the court’s reasoning
that a severe drop in prices caused by an unforeseeable event might bring
the contract within the purview of Article 79(1). Also important, however,
is the court’s view that even a 50 percent drop did not excuse performance,
and that such a shift was foreseeable in international markets.143
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If the Romay Court had attended to the intended meaning of the
word “impediment,” it would not have heard this case. Indeed, the very
logic the Court employed in making its decision supports the proposition
that it should not have done so. The Court made reference to the long term
nature of the contract at issue, and to the buyer’s extensive experience in the
international market. These are two key features of transborder contracts in
general, and the underlying message in the Court’s decision seems to be that
the matter of market change in this context should have been addressed in
the agreement, by the parties, and not brought to a court for adjudication.
This case offers a perfect example of why courts and tribunals should read
Article 79 to preclude market change defenses: when the parties know they
will not receive a hearing in cases like this, they will provide for these
contingencies themselves. It wastes the parties’ time and money – as it
undoubtedly did in this case – to ask a court to do what they should have
done themselves.
Other cases lead to similar conclusions. In similar circumstances, a
Russian Federation tribunal refused to excuse a Buyer who pleaded a drop
in prices, noting sternly that “a change in market conditions cannot serve as
an excuse for the Buyer to avoid payment for the goods.”144 Though the
tribunal did not elaborate, one reason for this ruling may have been the
limited meaning of the word “impediment.” More encouragingly, a
Bulgarian Tribunal went so far as to refuse even to allow the Seller to make
a price fluctuation argument under Article 79, a result that seems consistent
with the language of the treaty. A Buyer sought to be excused from further
performance of a contract to buy steel ropes because the increase in the
value of the dollar and a depressed construction market had depressed the
market.145 The Bulgarian tribunal ruled that these circumstances were not
covered by Article 79 of the CISG, and in any case were foreseeable.146
Two more cases, however, show that courts are still willing to do a
foreseeability analysis which should be left to the parties – i.e., one that
doesn’t first requires that the grounds for excuse fall under the narrow literal
meaning of “impediment.” The Appellate Court of Hamburg refused to
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excuse from a contract a Seller who tried to cease delivery of tomatoes.147
Market prices had gone up, and the court observed that the Seller “only
wanted to gain profit from the increased prices.”148 In 1989, the International
Chamber of Commerce refused to excuse a Seller from performance despite
a 13.16% increase in the price of the goods.149 The Buyer sought to exercise
a contractually guaranteed option to buy an additional 80,000 tons of steel
bars, and the Seller tried to renegotiate the price due to market changes.150
Although the Tribunal decided that the CISG did not apply, and used
Yugoslav law instead, it remarked that the outcome would have been the
same under the CISG, and found that fluctuations in steel prices were
predictable, and thus not grounds for excuse.151 The Tribunal noted the
necessity of a “strict approach in assessing lack of predictability,” and
observed that the increase in prices was “well within the customary
margin.”152 This leaves open the possibility, as do some of the American
cases, that a market change could be so severe that it would exceed “the
customary margin,” and offer grounds for excuse. As we have seen, this is
in harmony with UCC case law, which in at least one instance, the ALCOA
case, granted relief based upon the egregiousness of the circumstances.
Nonetheless, it seems that tribunals applying the CISG, like American
courts applying the UCC, are unreceptive to using market change as a basis
for excuse. In general, however, CISG-based holdings often rely on the idea
of foreseeability, implying that the word “impediment” is not a bar to
bringing an excuse claim for market change under the CISG, a trend I claim
is unfortunate. The next basis for excuse, third party failure, reveals more
dramatic differences between the two regimes.
B. Third Party and Supplier Failure
The UCC envisions two kinds of supply failure. One occurs when
the contract specifies a single source for the goods, and both parties have
agreed that this is to be the case. In this case, the failure of the agreed upon
147
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single source is a valid excuse for nonperformance. In the second kind, the
contract fails to specify a single source, and the source the seller has
counted on fails. In this case, the UCC is deemed to mandate that the seller
acquire the goods from any possible source, regardless of difficulty or
expense. These scenarios are perfectly in line with Section 2-615’s
language: if the contract identified a single source for the goods to be sold,
then that source’s failure is indeed the “occurrence of a contingency the
nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made.” The exception to this general rule is that 2-615 relief would not be
forthcoming if the parties discussed a particular supplier, or mentioned one
in the purchase order.153 Normally, the risk of failure is considered allocated
to the seller who promises to deliver and is assumed to know the market.154
Thus, the District Court of Maryland refused to excuse a seller’s
performance under a contract to sell antimony oxide when the seller’s
source failed, because the seller had every reason to know of problems with
the supplier and with the market in general, and the contract was silent as to
the source of the goods.155 Other courts applying the UCC agree that the
main test under the facts of supply failure is foreseeability.156 Without an
escape clause in the contract, moreover, courts will find the possible failure
supply failure allocated to the Seller.157 Moreover, the promissor must make
every effort to find alternate sources of supply.158
153
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Courts and tribunals hearing cases under Article 79 allow claims to
be brought involving suppliers, which, as we have seen, is probably not
consistent with the intention of the drafters or the analysis of the
commentators. While the general trend in CISG courts is to apply Article
79 very narrowly to cases involving supply failure, the fact that they do not
dismiss supplier-based defenses out of hand is noteworthy – and
unfortunate.
Rather than refuse to hear the claims under Article 79, CISG
tribunals employ reasoning similar to that of American courts applying the
UCC: the possible failure of a third party supplier is a contingency which
the seller should have anticipated. For example, the Arbitral Tribunal of
Hamburg has refused to excuse under Article 79 a Seller who failed to
deliver goods due to the financial difficulties of its manufacturer, noting that
such eventualities were within the risks the Seller was expected to bear.159
This Tribunal did not conduct a detailed application of Article 79(2) criteria,
but its decision is fully consistent with what they seem to require.
Apparently finding that the seller had failed the requirements of Article
79(2)(a) – i.e., finding that the possible supply failure was an impediment
the seller should have taken into account at the time of the contract – it did
not need to ask further whether, under Article 79(2)(b), the supplier would
have been culpable under paragraph one.160 Similarly, the District Court of
Hamburg refused to apply Article 79 to a Seller whose supplier raised the
price and had supply problems after the Seller had signed the contract with
the Buyer.161 The Tribunal observed that the financial straits of a Seller’s
manufacturer were not unforeseeable or terribly exceptional, as would be
required for a finding of force majeur.162 In neither case did the Tribunal
have to move beyond paragraph (2)(a): both found the analysis complete
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when they determined that supply failure was a foreseeable problem. This
result is perfectly consistent with American cases addressing this issue: both
regimes apply the foreseeability analysis.
Some Article 79 cases, however, show less willingness than
American courts to excuse a seller’s performance based on supplier failure.
In a noteworthy example, the International Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Tribunal found Article 79 inapplicable to a Seller’s failure to
find a supplier who could use the proper packaging for the goods it had
contracted to sell and deliver.163 Up to this point, the case seems predictable
by American standards: surely troubles with packaging are reasonably
foreseeable. The Tribunal went further, however: it added that, even if the
Seller had attempted to ascertain the supplier’s ability to use the packaging,
and had been given false information, he would still have been held
responsible because “the Seller’s responsibility for his supplier is an integral
part of the general risk of the supply of goods.”164 This seems likely to have
been a closer question under the UCC: is misleading, or deliberately false
information by a third party reasonably foreseeable by the seller? Though
the Tribunal in this case did not elaborate on its reasoning beyond the risk
analysis already noted, its ruling makes sense in light of the application of
Article 79(2)(b): a third party supplier who gave false information to the
seller would not be excused under 79(1), and thus the seller, under Article
79 as whole, would not be excused. This ruling seems more consistent
with the full analysis Article 79 requires – i.e., applying the same test to
both the main contractor and the third party. It remains the case, however,
that supplier failure probably has no place in this article, and the packaging
case is a particularly egregious example. Surely packaging does not have an
“organic” relationship to the contract.
With respect to third party excuses under Article 79, something
close to strict liability seems to operate. Again, this is consistent with the
article’s language. A Federal Supreme Court of Germany ruling reflects this
strictness in a much-cited case involving a contract for the sale of vine
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wax.165 The wax in question was a newly developed type of wax, and was
sent directly from the manufacturer to the Buyer in the original packaging,
as the Seller had requested.166 It turned out to be defective, and damaged the
vines it was used on. The nature of this transaction, it should be noted,
seems to fit more closely than the previous ones the requirements for the
definition of a third party supplier encompassed by Article 79 as set forth in
the commentary: the supplier was delegated to procure and supply the
buyer with the product. This seems arguably at least to be performing an
organic part of the contract. The lower court found that the Buyer had a
valid claim, and the Supreme Court agreed. It rejected the Seller’s
argument that, as a mere intermediary, it had no control over the wax.167 It
ruled that, under Article 79, the risk of a nonconforming delivery is
allocated to the promissor – in this case, the Seller – unless the contract
specifies otherwise.168 The promissor’s culpability or lack thereof is
immaterial: it is simply a matter of statutory allocation of risk.169
This case and others like it seem to restrict almost completely the
possibility for a Seller’s excuse under Article 79, but commentators have
suggested that excuse might exist in cases where the nonconformity is a
attributable to a risk which can neither be attributed to the sphere of
influence of the Seller nor that of his suppliers: for example, a Seller sells a
Buyer demonstrably safe foodstuffs for resale which are nonetheless
suspected of being dangerous by the public.170 The goods in such a case
would be nonconforming – because unusable – but the Seller could not be
held accountable for general public suspicion.171
There are, however, at least hypothetical scenarios under which a
seller may be excused. A recent German Supreme Court case offers such a
scenario.172 A Seller’s shipment of powdered milk was discovered, after
delivery, to be contaminated with lipase, and the Buyer sued.173 The Seller
first claimed that his performance should be excused because the infestation
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occurred after the milk had been delivered, and therefore the goods as
delivered had conformed to the contract.174 Remanding for further fact
finding on the timing of the contamination, the Supreme Court ruled that if
the existence of the infestation prior to the transfer – and thus the delivery of
noncomforming goods - could not be excluded, the Seller’s success under
Article 79 would depend on the Seller proving 1) that the contamination
would not have been detectable with the best possible testing methods, and
2) that any infestation had occurred outside of its sphere of influence.175
Although the court does not explain how this test derives from the
language of Article 79, it seems to do so. The Court’s first condition for
excusing the Seller – that the nonconformity would be undetectable with the
best possible methods of testing – arguably restates Article 79’s requirement
that the failure to perform be out of the Seller’s control. If “the best
available testing” failed to detect the defect, the Seller could not have
discovered and cured it, nor could he have taken it into account or overcome
its consequences. The Court’s second requirement that the Seller prove that
the infestation was caused by something “outside its sphere of influence,”
also restates Article 79’s “beyond the seller’s control” test.Another
exception to the fairly strict application of the third party excuse doctrine
article 79 seems to require appears in a French District Court case. The
District Court of Besancon, France, allowed a Seller to take refuge in
Article 79 when sweat suits it sold to a judo club owner in Switzerland
shrank in the Buyer’s wash.176 Again, under the UCC this would have arisen
as a breach of warranty case, but under the CISG it is was brought as a
breach through failure to deliver conforming goods, and the Seller sought
refuge from the breach claim in Article 79. Several extraneous factors may
account for this anomalous decision. First, according to the Tribunal, the
Buyer failed to prove that the entire shipment was nonconforming.177
Second, the Buyer had, despite the nonconformity, sold some of the suits
and derived a profit from them.178 Moreover, despite allowing the Seller to
claim excuse under Article 79, it did reduce the contract price to account for
the problems with the goods.179 The Tribunal’s reading of Article 79
jurisprudence, however, seems confused and at odds with the other cases.
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For example, it excused the Seller because the manufacturer was out of its
control, which should not be grounds for excuse.180 And, it notes an absence
of bad faith as another reason for applying Article 79.181 This reasoning not
only misses the point of Article 79, it also flies in the face of all the other
cases interpreting it.
A classic third party fact pattern emerges when strikes or other labor
disputes impede the performance of a third party to a contract. In general,
under 2-615 jurisprudence, strikes are not considered within the risks a
promissor should anticipate, but this is not absolute. As the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated in Mishara Construction, “[w]e are
asked to decide as matter of law and without reference to individual facts
and circumstances that picket lines strikes or labor difficulties provide no
excuse for nonperformance. This is too sweeping a statement of the law and
we decline to adopt it.”182 The Mishara Court explained that in determining
whether performance has become impracticable or whether the occurrence
at issue was one whose risk the parties bargained for, “the emphasis in
contracts governed by the Uniform Commercial Code is on the commercial
context in which the agreement was made.”183 Thus, in assessing the
question of whether a strike made performance under a particular contract
impractical, it is necessary to examine the facts known to the parties at the
time of signing with respect to the possibility of strikes during performance,
the history of strikes in the industry involved, and the potential severity of a
possible strike.184 In some cases, strikes, while an impediment, would be
considered neither unforeseeable nor out of the control of the promissor.
The one relevant case suggests that CISG courts would generally
consider strikes among the risks implicitly allocated to the promissor.185
Though striking workers employed directly by the main contractor seem a
likely candidate for third party status under Article 79, by the same token
this is exactly the kind of contingency that should be allocated to the seller:
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it is a generally foreseeable risk and one which an international business
person should foresee. Moreover, it is the kind of disturbance, which, if
allowed as an excuse, would severely undermine the security of transborder
deals. In the one available case involving a strike, a Seller sought to be
excused due to the fact that his failure to perform was due to an “emergency
stopping of … production” by a third party.186 The Tribunal ruled that the
Seller was expected to have taken such an impediment into account when
entering into the contract.187 Again, although the Tribunal does not offer a
detailed analysis, this result is consistent with the language of Article 79:
strikes were an impediment that both the Seller and the sub should have
“taken into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” Thus,
neither could find refuge in paragraphs 2(a) or 2(b). Both the 2-615 and
Article 79 call for an examination of the facts to determine whether a strike
is a basis for excuse or exemption.
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C.

Damages

The UCC is more lenient than the CISG to the non performing party
with respect to damages. With respect to damages, Albert Kritzer observes
that Article 79 “relieves but does not relieve.”188 Though it precludes
liability for damages when performance is excused, Article 79 does not
address other types of relief, such as a buyer’s right to reduction on price
(Article 50), the right of compel performance (articles 46, 62), the right to
avoid the contract (Articles 49, 64), the right to collect interest (Article 78),
right to collect penalties or liquidated damages if local law permits.189
Indeed, it specifically reserves a party’s right to these remedies. In contrast,
the UCC relieves the seller in cases of delayed, partial or non delivery due
to an excusing event from all liability.
A party who is not excused under Article 79 is liable for all
damages, including consequential damages. As one treatise explains, “under
the CISG, every breach of obligation produces a claim for damages as long
as the obligor cannot exempt himself from liability under Art. 79,” and “the
seller is therefore also liable in damages for the harm caused by the
defect.”190 Under the UCC, by contrast, a buyer who suffers damages due to
defective goods would sue the seller for breach of warranty.191 These
damages arise under Articles 45(1)(b), and Articles 74-76. Under CISG
Article 77, however, a complaining party must mitigate damages, and
failure to do so may result in the exclusion of the damages claim.
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany ruling in the vine wax case
also reflects this aspect of CISG contract damages.192 The court ruled that
the defendant could be liable for the damages because the wax it had
delivered did not meet the applicable industry standards, and was therefore
not in conformity with the contract. Because the seller had delivered nonconforming goods, he could be liable for any and all damages they caused.
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In accordance with Article 77, however, the court remanded the case for
further fact finding about defendant’s failure to mitigate damages.
Under the UCC, by contrast, the above case, the buyer would most
likely have brought a case for breach of warranty, and the seller would have
sued or impleaded the supplier for the same claim.193 In such a scenario, the
excuse issue would probably not have arisen. The CISG, however, creates
no separate warranty claims: whatever damages flow from the delivery of
defective goods are part of the breach of contract claim, thus making the
excuse defense appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the discrepancies in their language, 2-615 and Article 79
have proven similarly unhelpful to those seeking excuse for
nonperformance. UCC cases reflect the same spirit that animates the CISG
by rarely excusing performance when the hindering contingency is anything
but a physical impediment. In cases involving extreme financial hardship
due to market changes, the UCC’s “impracticability” doctrine has so far
offered occasional refuge while the CISG’s “impediment” doctrine has
offered none. With respect to third party liability, both legal systems agree
that events which are foreseeable to the seller provide no basis for excuse;
the systems differ in that the UCC analysis ends there, while the CISG
analysis goes on to ask whether the third party subcontractor itself should
have foreseen the difficulty. If anything, this has so far led to a stricter
application of the excuse doctrine in cases involving third party
performance. With respect to damages, success under 2-615 cuts of liability
for damages on the part of the nonperforming party, while success under
Article 79 does not.
The main problem with the way tribunals apply Article 79, I suggest,
is that they hear defenses which the drafters did not intend to allow under
the Article, i.e., defenses which fall short of physical impediments.
Moreover, at least one tribunal has excused performance for third party
failure under Article 79 when the Article’s language does not seem to justify
it. A more restrictive application of the CISG is consistent with its intent,
makes perfect sense in cross border sales, and should be encouraged.
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The difference between UCC and CISG jurisdictions, then, is that
UCC courts are willing to examine the circumstances of the contract and
infer which party had assumed the risk, while the CISG, at least ideally,
forces the parties to make the risk determination explicit. Thus, the CISG
leads parties to do the kind of risk analysis as part of the contract
negotiation and drafting, which is the only way suitable for international
transactions. Courts and tribunals seeking to strengthen uniform sales law
and facilitate transborder transactions should adhere to the narrow path the
drafters laid down.
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